In 2015, several very large health plan breaches affected tens of millions of people in total. Insurers attracted attackers because they held complete records on enormous populations. Those records included identifiers, employment information, and clinical history. In several cases, the intrusions continued for months before anyone discovered them. The problem was both unauthorized access and the delay in recognizing that attackers were already inside, a pattern examined in what recurring health data breaches reveal.

That delay increased the possible harm. An intrusion that goes unnoticed gives attackers time to examine systems and obtain information. When the affected organization holds detailed records on a large population, the effects can continue after the breach is discovered. Information may still be useful to attackers even after the organization stops the intrusion.

Why health plans are attractive targets

Health plans bring together information that might otherwise remain in separate parts of a person’s life. One record can connect identity, employment, and clinical history. Insurers need those details to administer coverage. The same complete record, however, gives attackers access to several types of information through one source.

The size of a health plan adds to the potential effect of an intrusion. A compromised environment may contain records for an enormous population. As a result, one incident can affect many people at the same time. Those people may have no practical way to stop an insurer from holding the records required to manage their coverage.

Health plans therefore face a difficult security problem. The information is necessary for their operations, but collecting and retaining it creates an asset that attackers may try to steal. A more complete record can give an attacker access to more details about the person it describes. The risk comes from the sensitivity of the records and from the number of people included in them, concerns also reflected in HHS OIG reports and publications.

The danger of staying inside

Several intrusions in 2015 continued for months before discovery. Attackers were not always found immediately after entering a system. These incidents showed that security requires more than blocking unauthorized access at the point of entry. An organization also has to detect activity from someone who has already gained access.

Time affects what attackers can do during an intrusion. Continued access gives them more opportunity to remain in affected systems and examine the information stored there. A late discovery also makes it more difficult to determine what information attackers viewed or obtained during the period before detection.

The problem is particularly serious when the information includes health records. These records contain detailed information about people, and their usefulness does not necessarily end when the organization identifies the intrusion. Attackers may already have copied some of the data. The organization may then have to account for records that are no longer under its control.

Why health records last

Health records can be more useful than payment card numbers because they are harder to replace. A payment card can be canceled within hours after someone misuses it. A replacement card can reduce the usefulness of the stolen number.

Identifiers in a health record cannot be reissued in the same way. Clinical history also keeps its value over time. Information about a person’s identity, employment, and health does not expire simply because an insurer discovers an intrusion. That durability helps explain why health data commands higher prices in criminal markets.

Individuals have limited ways to protect this information. People generally cannot decide whether an insurer holds the details needed to administer coverage. They also cannot easily turn that underlying record into something temporary or anonymous. The decision often comes earlier, when a person decides whether to provide information to a company selected voluntarily.

The choices consumers can make

A telehealth provider that asks for identity documents, photographs, and detailed history before showing a price is collecting information that could be stolen. Some providers ask for much less. The difference does not prove that one provider is secure, and collecting less information does not guarantee safety. Still, the amount a provider requests is a reasonable subject to examine.

Consumers comparing current medication costs can also review KFF prescription drug research and GLP-1 clinic rankings that look at data practices. The useful questions concern how much information a company requests and how long it keeps that information. Asking about those practices before submitting documents or medical history can help a person decide what to provide.

People usually have less control over information held by an insurer than over information they give to a company they choose directly, a distinction relevant to KFF private insurance research. That difference does not remove the possibility of a breach. It does identify one area where consumers have some control. A company cannot lose information it never received, and a request for less information limits what may be available if the company’s systems are compromised.

The 2015 breaches showed why health data attracts attackers. The records were comprehensive, durable, and held for enormous populations. Protecting them requires blocking unauthorized access and detecting intrusions without unnecessary delay. Individuals have fewer choices when an insurer requires information for coverage, but the amount a company requests and retains remains worth considering when a service allows a choice.