Ransomware is a health care continuity and privacy problem as well as an information technology problem. Campaigns can cross borders within hours, placing hospitals, clinics, and their vendors in the same queue as banks and shipping companies. After an attack, the organization has to determine what happened to protected health information, whether notifications are required, and which partners share responsibility for the response.

How ransomware disrupts care

The mechanics are familiar. Malicious code may reach a machine through an email attachment, an exposed remote access port, or an unpatched service. It then encrypts files and leaves a payment demand. If those files support scheduling, imaging, or pharmacy operations, the related systems may become unavailable even when the attacker has not visibly changed a clinical record.

Unavailable systems can delay care. A clinic may be unable to retrieve its schedule. An imaging department may lose access to relevant files. A pharmacy system may be unavailable for routine work. The effects can spread beyond the organization that was first infected when a vendor supplies a system used by several providers.

The international reach of these campaigns adds pressure, but the immediate problem for the affected organization remains direct: it must continue serving patients while determining the scope of the incident. Restoration may begin before the investigation is complete. Communication and privacy review may also need to proceed during that period.

A ransomware event can create two related problems at once. Files may be unavailable to the people who need them, while the organization determines whether protected health information was involved. The service disruption does not wait for the privacy analysis to finish. At the same time, the privacy analysis cannot be set aside simply because the visible demand concerns payment.

Which obligations are triggered

Under the United States Code, a covered entity that experiences a ransomware event has to address several questions. Was protected health information involved? Did the attacker acquire it, or was it only made unavailable? Does the event require notification to patients, the Office for Civil Rights, and, in some cases, the media?

Encryption can prevent access to records without showing that someone viewed or copied them. That distinction does not resolve the matter. HHS regulatory documents have generally treated an attacker’s encryption of records as a presumed breach unless the covered entity can demonstrate a low probability of compromise through a documented risk assessment.

A ransom demand therefore does not establish that the problem is limited to locked files. The organization must examine whether protected health information was involved and record the basis for its conclusion. Notification review is part of the incident response. It is not simply a later task that starts after systems have been restored.

Vendors may also be part of the response. Health care organizations depend on companies that provide systems and handle information. Their contracts must require business associates to carry their share of the obligation. A provider has to review its own systems and the security posture and response duties connected to the companies that support its operations.

Why patients and customers should care

Anyone who gives personal and medical details to a telehealth service relies on its security practices and those of the vendors connected to it. A ransomware event can place records at risk and interrupt systems used to deliver or manage care. The result may be a privacy concern, a delay in care, or both.

When comparing providers, modern medication costs are only one part of the decision. Patients should read the clinic privacy and security information as closely as the price sheet. Patients cannot independently verify every technical safeguard, but a provider’s treatment of personal and medical details remains a material part of the service.

A telehealth company may depend on outside systems for scheduling, prescriptions, records, or communications. If one of those systems is affected, a patient may face delays or uncertainty without dealing with the vendor directly. Clear privacy and security terms can explain how information is handled and which parties may be involved. Written terms, however, do not remove the underlying risk. The importance of those safeguards is also discussed in The unglamorous half of health data security.

The defenses that matter

Practical defenses include current patches, offline backups that have been tested, segmented networks, and contracts that require business associates to carry their share of the obligation.

Patches address the unpatched services through which malicious code may enter. Offline backups provide a recovery option only when the organization has confirmed that they work. Segmented networks can limit the spread of malicious code after it reaches one machine. Contracts can define the responsibilities of business associates when vendors handle systems or information for a health care organization.

No measure guarantees that a ransomware campaign will fail. These defenses address both parts of the problem. They reduce the chance that malicious code will spread and improve the organization’s ability to restore operations after an incident. For patients, health data security affects confidentiality and access to care. It belongs in the evaluation of a telehealth service alongside its clinical and financial terms. For broader context on the privacy issues that follow a breach, see Health data privacy at the end of 2015.