Privacy moved into the breach conversation

By late 2015, health care data privacy had become a public issue rather than a back-office concern. Large breaches involving payers and providers brought patient records into the same public discussion as retail and financial data, a pattern also examined in coverage of recurring health data breaches. The number of affected individuals showed that health information was a direct target in major incidents, not merely information lost along the way.

The breaches also led to closer review of how health care organizations handled information before, during, and after an incident. Investigators and the public wanted to know whether an organization had identified its risks, protected the information in its possession, and kept control over vendors that handled protected health information.

The regulatory response developed alongside the breaches, as reflected in HHS documents in the Federal Register. Enforcement under HIPAA continued to focus on operational failures that investigations repeatedly found. These included incomplete risk analyses, portable devices without encryption, and weak oversight of vendors with access to protected health information.

The issues were connected. An incomplete risk analysis could leave an organization unaware of an exposure. If a portable device lacked encryption, its loss could result in a disclosure. Weak vendor controls could leave an organization unable to say where protected health information was being handled or whether the vendor was meeting its obligations.

Enforcement became an ongoing obligation

The effect of enforcement extended beyond the possibility of a payment after a breach. Settlement terms during this period often included corrective action plans that lasted for several years, as reflected in HHS OIG reports and publications. These plans placed organizations under continuing federal supervision after a lapse.

Privacy therefore became a continuing operational responsibility. An organization could not treat a risk analysis as a one-time task separate from its systems and daily practices. Portable devices required review because an unencrypted device could expose protected health information if it was lost. Vendor oversight also required direct attention. An organization could not assume that an outside company would manage the risk without supervision.

Business associates took on a more consequential role after the omnibus rule took effect. They could be held directly responsible and named in an enforcement matter, rather than treated as someone else’s problem. Health care information often moved through several organizations, so responsibility did not rest only with the payer or provider that first collected it.

This created a wider view of organizational responsibility. A health care organization had to account for companies that handled protected health information. Those business associates also faced direct accountability for their own conduct. A lapse could expose weaknesses in the relationship between two organizations, as well as weaknesses in one organization’s internal controls.

State action added another layer

Federal enforcement was only one source of exposure. State officials became more willing to bring their own actions under state breach notification and consumer protection statutes. As a result, one incident could lead to separate federal and state proceedings.

This overlap made privacy governance relevant before an incident. A federal matter could involve a corrective action plan lasting several years, while a state action could create separate consequences. When organizations assessed their security practices, vendor relationships, and breach response, they had to account for more than one level of oversight.

The same questions could arise when a person bought medication through an online clinic. Intake forms, prescription history, and card details might remain with the same company. The clinic’s data practices could therefore become part of the purchasing decision. For readers comparing prices and operating details, a comparison of online clinic services can sit alongside a policy question: whether the provider appears to understand its responsibilities when it collects and uses health information.

A provider’s description of its practices does not prove that its systems are secure. It can still show how the organization describes its responsibilities and the information it collects. A clear explanation may help a customer understand the provider’s role and its relationships with outside companies. A vague explanation makes it harder to determine who controls the data and what happens after an incident.

The lasting policy lesson

The enforcement picture in 2015 linked privacy failures to ordinary business decisions. Risk assessments, device security, vendor oversight, and incident response were part of the way a payer, provider, or business associate operated. They were not tasks that could be separated from the organization’s systems or its relationships with other companies. This broader pattern also appears in earlier health care enforcement trends.

The direct accountability of business associates also matched the way health care data moved through the system. An organization could not assume that its responsibility ended when information left its own network. When a vendor handled protected health information, that relationship became part of the organization’s privacy analysis.

By the end of 2015, the central policy question was broader than whether a breach had occurred. It concerned whether an organization had established durable processes to identify risks, control information, supervise vendors, and respond to more than one level of government when those controls failed.